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REMOVAL AND RE-ELECTION OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS

O N THE 1st day of September, 1932, the Mayor of the
City of New York resigned his office. Because the City
of New York is perhaps the most important urban center in
the world, and also because its Mayor was so well known
throughout the land and because his affairs had been widely
discussed in the press, the legal problems that arose as a
result of his resignation became the subject of frequent discussion not only among lawyers, but also among laymen.'
Public interest in a cause celbre always produces confused
thinking about its legal essentials. It therefore escaped the
attention of many lawyers that some of the problems involved
in the resignation of the Mayor of the City of New York
were simple legal problems about which the courts had
spoken on other less auspicious occasions.
It is here proposed to analyze one aspect of the situation
from the strictly legal point of view and to determine
whether if a public officer resigns his office, pending proceedings looking to his removal, he can be elected or appointed to
fill that office for the remainder of the unexpired term. This
question has several aspects to it. In the first place, we must
determine whether an officer who has been removed from his
office by the properly constituted authorities, can be re-elected
by the people to fill the balance of the unexpired term. In
the second place, we must determine whether an officer who
has been removed by the properly constituted authorities
may be appointed by the body having the appointing power
to fill the balance of the unexpired term. In the third and
fourth places, we must answer these two questions with regard to an officer who has resigned his office pending removal
proceedings.
There is a logical differentiation between appointing a
removed or resigned officer to fill the balance of an unexpired
term and the election of that officer by the people to fill the
balance of the unexpired term. In the former case, if the
'See New York Times, Sept. 3, 1932, p. 1, col. 7; Sept. 4, 1932, p. 1, cols.
7 and 8; Sept. 13, 1932, p. 20, col. 8.
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Governor has the power of removal and the Board of Aldermen has the power of appointment to fill vacancies, an endless and futile chain of events might be set in motion by the
appointment of the man whom the Governor had removed.
For no sooner would the Board of Aldermen appoint than
the Governor would remove, or could if he chose. On the
other hand, this being a democratic country, and the ultimate
choice of our public officers being lodged in the hands of the
electorate, the official who has the removing power must be
satisfied or should be satisfied when the electorate has vetoed
his act of removal by re-electing, for the balance of the unexpired term, the very man whom he has removed. These considerations apply with equal force to an officer who has resigned pending removal proceedings, as they do to an officer
who has actually been removed.'
The statutes of the various states are curiously silent
with regard to the situation that is here discussed. It would
appear &priorithat this is eminently a matter for legislative
action and even perhaps for constitutional provision. Yet
neither the Federal Constitution nor the various state constitutions nor any of the statutes in any of the states seem to
contain any provisions with regard to this situation. And
such law as there is has been entirely judicially created.
The judicial point of view is determined by the polite
fiction which identifies the office with the term of office. It is
suggested in some of the cases that the removal of an officer
from his office is equivalent to a removal from the term of
office, and that therefore he is disqualified from further
holding that office.
In the state of New York, the leading case is People v.
Ahearn.3 In that case a Borough President was removed by
the Governor after a hearing upon charges. The power to
fill vacancies, however, was lodged in those members of the
Board of Aldermen representing the borough of Brooklyn.
These gentlemen met and redesignated the removed Borough
President to fill the balance of the unexpired term. A majority of the Court of Appeals held that the removed Borough
President was ineligible for redesignation for the unexpired
'Infra notes 11, 12, 13, 14.

- 196 N. Y. 221, 89 N. E. 930 (1909).
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term by the members of the Board of Aldermen. A careful
reading of that decision, however, would seem to indicate
that the Court had more serious consequences in mind than a
mere holding that a removed officer could not be reappointed
to fill the balance of the unexpired term, and that they were
also inclined to the view that even the re-election of such an
officer for the balance of the unexpired term would not be
permissible. The Court referred to and relied upon a precedent from the House of Representatives dating back to
1870, where one Whitmore, having been refused admission as
a member of the House, went back to his district and was
re-elected, and thereupon the House again refused to admit
him on the theory that he was not eligible to fill the balance
of the unexpired term, having been removed on account of
serious charges. 4 The learned judge, writing the opinion in
the Ahearn case, said:
"While personally I am not prepared to assent to the
proposition that if the power of filling the vacancy
caused by the appellant's removal had been conferred
upon the voters of a limited district to be exercised by
election, they would have had any greater power or
discretion than the board of aldermen, it is sufficient
to say for the present that that question is not here
and it is not necessary to pass upon it." 5
While this language is of course not decisive of anything,
and is at best merely a dictum, it nevertheless indicates the
general point of view of the Court to the effect that the election of a removed official stands on no better plane than his
appointment. Taken together with the reliance of the Court
on the Whitmore case, 6 it is of course very strongly corroborative of the idea that re-election for the balance of the unexpired term is as much forbidden as reappointment.
On the other hand, the state of New Jersey came to a
different conclusion. In the case of State ex rel. Tyrrell v.
Common Council of Jersey City,7 it was held that a member
'Ibid.
Ibid. note 3 at p. 235, 89 N. E. 930 at p. 934.
aSupra note 3.
.25 N. J. L. 536 (1855).
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of the Common Council who had been removed from his
office for disorderly conduct might be re-elected by the
people to fill the balance of the unexpired term. The Court
took the view that the Common Council which had the
authority to expel a member or to remove him from office,
did not have authority to object to his being re-elected by the
electorate for the balance of the term, and that it was the
people, whom an officer represented, who were primarily concerned with the question of whether or not he should hold
that office, and that, consequently, the choice of the people
duly made at an election should not be overridden by the
courts. The Court said:
"In the second place, we are of opinion that the sentence of expulsion, or amotion, did not disqualify Tyrrell to be re-elected to the same office. When the council expelled him, they had exhausted their power; their
authority went no further; the charter does not annex
to the sentence of expulsion that of disqualification;
nor have the council, nor could they legally. Where
the law annexes a disqualification to an offense, as
part of its punishment, it does it in express terms." 8
The Tyrrell case, however, stands almost alone in the
expression of this point of view. A similar idea may be
found in the dissenting opinion of the Ahearn case. There
the dissenting judge said:
"But the difficulty in this case with the judgment
below is that the legislature has enacted no provision
of that character, and that judgment cannot be sustained unless this court holds as a matter of law that
removal from office disqualifies from re-election or
reappointment to the vacancy, although there is no
statutory enactment to that effect. I had supposed
that the law was too firmly established to the contrary
to be open to question." 9
The point of view of the dissenting judge in the Ahearn
case and of the Court in the Tyrrell case commend themselves
'Ibid.
at p. 542.
9
Supra note 3 at p. 246, 89 N.E. 930, at p. 939.
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to the mind as logical and forceful in so far as they deal with
election by the people of a removed candidate to fill a vacancy. Certainly the Court ought not without statutory
compulsion assume the obligation of passing upon the
people's choice. And while in practice the existence of the
machinery of politics often prevents a clear-cut choice by the
people, nevertheless the theory of American institutions is
that an election duly held by the people constitutes the
people's choice. It may very well be that in practical operation this theory is not always carried out. Yet surely the
remedy is not for the courts to find but for the legislature
and constitution makers.
The courts, however, have not hesitated to take a different view as will appear from the decision of the Supreme
Court of Kansas in the case of State ex rel. Coleman v. Rose.10
In that case, on the 3rd day of April, 1906, the Mayor of Kansas City filed his resignation. A proceeding was then pending
in a court looking to his removal, and, as a matter of fact, a
judgment of removal was actually entered against him three
days after he had resigned. In spite of his resignation and
subsequent removal, the people of Kansas City re-elected him
to fill the vacancy caused by his resignation and removal.
Nevertheless, the Court held that he was ineligible to fill the
vacancy in spite of his re-election by the people. That case has
been frequently cited and relied upon as an authority for the
proposition that an officer who was removed or had resigned
under fire was ineligible to fill the vacancy caused by his
removal or resignation. The rule in that case is, of course, in
direct conflict with the rules set up in the New Jersey case,
and no other case has been found in which an officer who has
been removed or who had resigned under fire was declared2
ineligible for re-election. In the states of Utah," Iowa,'
Minnesota,' 3 and Tennessee,14 decisions of the highest courts
have made it clear that an officer once removed or who resigned under fire was ineligible for reappointmentto fill the
, 74 Kan. 262, 86 Pac. 296 (1906).
Skeen v. Payne, 32 Utah 295, 90 Pac. 440 (1907).
"State ex rel. Cosson v. Baughn, 162 Iowa 308, 143 N. W. 1100 (1913).
21 State of Minn. ex rel Childs v. Dart, 57 Minn. 261, 59 N. W. 190 (1894).
" State ex rel Thompson v. Crump, 134 Tenn. 121, 183 S. W. 505 (1915).
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vacancy. These cases have all proceeded on the theory that
the redesignation by the appointing power is a futile gesture,
in view of the fact that the person redesignated is at once
subject to the prospect of being again removed by the authority which had previously removed him. In only one case
have we found the suggestion that an officer who resigned
under fire stands in a different position from one who is
actually removed. And that case was decided by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana. 15 There the Court indicated that disqualification to hold office even for the balance of an unexpired term can only result from removal after trial in which
the incumbent was heard in his own defense. This point,
however, while noted by the Court, is not essentially involved
in the decision.
It will readily appear that this collection of cases does
not dispose of the questions that we propounded at the outset of this discussion but that they still leave open, at least
in the state of New York, two questions: first, may an officer
who has been removed be re-elected to fill the vacancy even
if he may not be reappointed to fill the vacancy, as was held
in the Ahearn case, and second, may an officer who has resigned under fire be either reappointed or re-elected to fill
the vacancy.
If we follow the general tenor of the decision in the
Ahearn case, we must come to the conclusion that an officer
who has been removed may neither be appointed nor be
re-elected to fill the balance of the unexpired term. On the
other hand, if we conclude that the New Jersey case states a
better rule, there is nothing in the Ahearn case that will
prevent the Court of Appeals from ultimately concluding
that a removed officer may be re-erected to fill the vacancy.
As we -have already stated, this view commends itself to
logical reasoning.
With regard to the second question, as to whether an
officer who has resigned under fire is eligible for either
appointment or election to fill the vacancy, I think we can
say with certainty that there is no important body of judicial
opinion that places an officer who resigned under fire upon
any different footing from one who has actually been re'

State ex rel. Arcenaux v. Breaux, 169 La. 394, 125 So. 283 (1929).
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moved. It would therefore follow that whatever conclusions
the court should come to with regard to a removed officer
would also apply to an officer who has resigned under fire.
It cannot be that the courts will permit an officer who has
been charged with conduct justifying his removal to avoid
the consequences of his conduct by simply resigning before
the conclusion of the proceedings. That result would render
removal proceedings entirely innocuous.
Viewing the matter in its brightest light, it seems
to us that this entire problem is most properly fitted for
legislative and constitutional provision and that the various states of the Union ought to provide in their organic
law, or at least by statute, a solution to this vexing problem. The personnel of public officers is a matter of paramount public interest and it is highly undesirable that the
selection or continuation in office of public servants should
depend upon considerations which are complicated by technical legal reasoning. These determinations involve the
consideration of problems of policy which have vast consequences to the public welfare and therefore should be
removed as rapidly as possible from the purview of judicial
decision. There is a sphere of governmental activity, and
perhaps a constantly increasing one, in which judicial review
is not a very efficient medium for social control, This proposition is no longer new in juristic literature and has the sanction of distinguished commentators on public affairs. 16
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